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REAL RIGHTS: LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL AND
TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
In civil law systems, contractual and testamentary freedom
in the field of property is limited by rules of public policy enacted
in the general interest.' Apart from general limitations, however,
the creation of real rights by juridical act is subject to special
rules which are largely insusceptible of modification by agree-
ment of the parties. These rules, limiting contractual and testa-
mentary freedom, are designed to effect a balance between in-
dividual demands for the recognition of modifications of property
rights to suit individual needs and social demands for the preser-
vation of a relatively simple system of unencumbered property.
The following discussion is devoted to an investigation of the
scope of contractual and testamentary freedom in the creation
of real rights, which may take the form of conventional servi-
tudes, restraints on trade, restraints on alienation, and building
restrictions. Attention will be focused, primarily, on the precepts
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and on the jurisprudence of
Louisiana courts. For purposes of comparison and for a better
understanding of typical civilian solutions, reference will be
made to Roman law and to the legal systems of France, Germany,
and Greece.
1. Conventional Servitudes
Article 709 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and corres-
ponding article 686 of the French Civil Code declare that "owners
have a right to establish on their estates, or in favor of their
estates, such servitudes as they deem proper; provided, neverthe-
less, that the services be not imposed on the person or in favor of
the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an estate; and
provided, moreover, that such services imply nothing contrary to
the public order."' There is no article directly corresponding in
the German or Greek Civil Code, but similar limitations on con-
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1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 87, 96, 117, 118 (1966).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 709; La. Civ. Code art. 705 (1825); La. Digest of
1808, bk. II, tit. IV, art. 49.
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tractual and testamentary freedom are acquired from the legis-
lative definition of predial servitudes. 3 The reason the redactors
of the French Civil Code felt compelled to spell out the limits
of contractual and of testamentary freedom in connection with
the creation of predial servitudes may be properly understood
in the light of historical developments.
In Roman law, predial servitudes were charges laid on an
estate in favor of another estate, i.e., real rights on things be-
longing to another owner (jura in re aliena).4 In medieval French
law, however, predial servitudes evolved into forms of feudal
tenures, burdening lands as well as persons.5 Thus, the tenant of
the servient estate owed certain personal duties to the owner of
the dominant estate and occupied toward him a position of social
inferiority.6 These feudal institutions were wiped out by the
Revolution; and, in giving expression to the new social order, the
redactors of the Code Civil sought ways to insure that the old
tenures be not resurrected. The best assurance in that regard
would be the elimination of real rights other than full ownership
and the suppression of contractual freedom in the domain of
property law. Yet, there was a legitimate demand for the recog-
nition of proprietary interests less than full ownership, and one
of the fundamental precepts of the new legislation was freedom
of the will. Faced with these contradictory demands, the redac-
3. See BGB § 1018; GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 1118, 1119.
4. See W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-B00K OF ROMAN LAW 259 (2d ed. 1950);
M. KASER, DAS ROMISCHE PRIVATRECHT 125 (1955); SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTI-
TUTIONEN 323 (17th ed. 1923). Of. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 85
(1966).
5. In pre-revolutionary French law, the distinction between personal and
real rights applied to institutions of Roman origin only. Feudal institutions
were insusceptible of this distinction because they involved charges on
lands as well as on persons. See BEUDANT, LA TRANSFORMATION DE LA PROPRIOTf]
FONCI9RE DANS LE DROIT INTERM9rDIAIRE 122, 123 (Thesis, Paris 1889); CH2NON,
LES DPMEMBREMENTS DE LA PROPRITI FONCIRE EN FRANCE AVANT ET APRES LA
RPVOLUTION 18 (2d ed. 1923); 2 CHANON, IIISTOIRE 02N5RALE DU DROIT FRAN9AIS
PUBLIC ET PRIVA § 372 (1929).
6. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT2 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 916
(2d ed. Picard 1952). This is the reason why the redactors of the French
Civil Code took care to state that "the servitude does not establish any
pre-eminence of one estate over the other." FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 638.
Article 2, bk. II, tit. IV, of the Louisiana Digest of 1808 contained a pro-
vision corresponding to article 638 of the French Civil Code. This provi-
sion was rightly suppressed in the 1825 revision. The redactors observed:
"We have thought best to suppress this article which prescribed, that
servitudes did not establish any right of pre-eminence of an estate over
another, as it is copied from the Code Napoleon, and was adopted in
France only for the purpose of preventing, that under the title of servitude
feudal rights should be established, which had been before abolished. It is
utterly useless among us." 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVEs, PROJET OF THE CIVIL
CODE OF 1825, at 71 (1937).
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tors of the Code Civil struck a happy balance. Contractual and
testamentary freedom in matters of property law ought to be
respected, provided that the limits of public policy are not trans-
cended. Thus, neither feudal tenures may be resurrected nor in-
terests be created contrary to article 686 of the Code Civil.7
Within these broad limits individuals may modify the provisions
of the Code by dismembering their ownership as they see fit and
by establishing "such servitudes as they deem proper.""
In addition to the general prohibition of servitudes in viola-
tion of the public order, Civil Codes require that "services be not
imposed on the person or in favor of the person."9 These two re-
strictions on contractual and testamentary freedom form the
subject of the following discussion.
Services may not be imposed on a person. In the absence of
contrary provision of law, predial servitudes may not involve the
performance of affirmative acts by the owner of the servient
estate.'" For example, the owner of the servient estate may not
be bound by virtue of a predial servitude to cultivate the domi-
nant estate or to maintain that estate in good state of repair.
Such duties may properly form the object of personal obliga-
tions." A predial servitude is a dismemberment of ownership, a
real right by virtue of which the owner of the dominant estate is
entitled to exercise certain prerogatives of ownership over the
servient estate; correspondingly, the owner of the servient estate
is merely charged with the duty to tolerate the acts of the owner
of the dominant estate.12
The law prohibits services intended to form the main object
7. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 87 (1966); 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITP-PRATIQUE DE DEOIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 917 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 709; FRENCH CiV. CODE art. 686. A survey of Louisiana
and French jurisprudence indicates that there have been few instances
in which parties sought to create servitudes contrary to public order. See
Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403
(1912). For French jurisprudence, see Montpellier, July 8, 1879, D. 1880.2.24,
S. 1880.2.48 (stipulation establishing the right to open a window and throw
refuse on the back yard of- a neighbor; held, servitude not contrary to
public order); cf. Req., April 29, 1872, D. 1873.1.132, S. 1873.1.308.
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 709; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 686. For general dis-
cussion, see JOUVENET, L'ARTICLE 686 DU CODE CIVIL (Thesis, Grenoble 1935).
10. Cf. Pomponius, D. 8.1.15: "Servitutium non ea natura est, ut aliquit
faciat."
11. Cf. Paris, Jan. 17, 1907, D. 1908.2.221; Note, Demogue, 9 REV. TRIM.
DR. Civ. 435 (1910). Accordingly, these obligations are transferable to
acquirers by particular title only if expressly assumed. For the distinction
between personal obligations, real obligations, and real rights, see A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 88, 90, 112 (1966).
12. See A. YIANNOPOTULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 88, 90, 112 (1966).
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of the servitude; it does not exclude the imposition of certain in-
cidental duties that may be necessary for the exercise or preser-
vation of the servitude. Thus, parties may freely stipulate that
the owner of the servient estate shall be charged with the duty
to keep his estate fit for the purposes of the servitude or that he
shall maintain in good state of repair certain works on his land
needed for the use or preservation of the servitude.'3 And, under
all Civil Codes, if the exercise of the servitude requires certain
structures, the owner of the servient estate must keep these
structures fit at his expense, unless the contrary is stipulated.14
French jurisprudence goes still further: the owner of the servient
estate may be charged with the duty to produce certain materials,
such as coal needed for a factory on the dominant estate, 5 or the
generation and transmission of electricity.16 In these circum-
stances, the duties imposed on the owner of the servient estate
form real rather than personal obligations which are transfer-
able to particular successors without stipulation to that effect. 17
The prohibition against personal services, other than those
regarded as incidental for the use or preservation of the servi-
tude, applies to both conventional and legal servitudes.'8 In the
case of legal servitudes, however, the law may impose on the
owner of the servient estate certain affirmative duties which
could hardly be regarded as incidental. Thus, in France, owners
fronting public streets may be charged with the duty to plant
trees, forest owners may be required to keep safety zones for
protection against fires, and homeowners may be charged with
the duty to uplift the facade of buildings. 9 In Louisiana, land-
owners may be charged with the duty to keep levees in good
state of repair20 and navigable waterways free of growing vege-
tation on the banks.21
13. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 699, 712, 773; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 698;
BGB § 1021; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 1126. For French decisions, see Req., Feb.
22, 1881, D. 1881.1.407, S. 1882.1.111; Civ., April 3, 1865, D. 1865.1.391, S.
1865.1.216.
14. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 773; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 698; BGB § 1022;
GREEK CIV. CODE art. 1127.
15. Civ., Jan. 9, 1901, D. 1901.1.450, S. 1901.1.169.
16. Pau, Feb. 14, 1912, D. 1913.2.99, S. 1912.2.249, Note by Bonnecase. See
also Req., Feb. 12, 1941, Gaz. Pal. 1941.1.392.
17. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]l PRATIQUE DO DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 920
(2d ed. Picard 1952); Civ., March 7, 1859, D. 1859.1.157, S. 1859.1.504; Req.,
Feb. 22, 1881, D. 1881.1.407, S. 1882.1.111. For the notion of real obligations,
see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 112 (1966).
18. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIThI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS 920
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
19. 2 FERAUD-GIRAUD, LES SERVITUDES DE VOIRIE 113 (1850).
20. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 34 (1966).
21. See [1938-1940] LA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 715.
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Services may not be imposed in favor of a person. According
to traditional civilian precepts which have been incorporated in
modern civil codes, predial servitudes may not be stipulated in
favor of named persons; they must be stipulated in favor of any-
one who happens to be owner of the dominant estate. Moreover,
rights which have no direct relationship with the use or exploita-
tion of the dominant estate may not be stipulated in the form of
predial servitudes.
In Roman law, the creation of a predial servitude was sub-
ject to the requirements that there be two estates, and that the
servitude have for its object the use or benefit of the estate in
favor of which it was established. 22 Rights which had no direct
relationship with the use of the dominant estate could not form
the object of predial servitudes. Thus, the right to take a walk,
or to collect fruits or flowers, on the land of another could not
be stipulated as a predial servitude; however, it could properly
form the object of a usufruct or of a right of use because the
beneficiary could derive the contemplated advantage whether he
was owner of an estate or not.2 3 But the right to take certain
materials from an estate could form the object of either a predial
servitude or a usufruct, depending on whether the contemplated
advantage was attributed directly to an estate or to a person. For
example, the right to take dirt needed for the marketing of the
agricultural products of the dominant estate in ceramic con-
tainers could be stipulated as a predial servitude. If, however,
the dirt was needed for the operation of a pottery, the servient
estate could be burdened only with a usufruct because the ad-
vantage was attributed to the owner of the manufacturing
establishment. 24
The formulas used by Roman jurisconsults are reflected in
the language of articles 709 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
and 686 of the French Civil Code. These articles declare that
services may not be imposed "in favor of the person, but only
... in favor of an estate. '25 French commentators of past genera-
tions have interpreted the provision literally to mean that predial
servitudes must be advantageous to the dominant estate rather
22. See Ulpian, D. 8.4.1.: "Nemo . .. potest servitutem adquirere . . .
nisi qui habet praedium ..
23. See Paul, D. 8.1.8.
24. See Paul, D. 8.3.6.
25. LA. Civ. CODE art. 709; FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 686.
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than its owner.26 Modern authors, however, have observed that
the contrast between the dominant estate and its owner is "un-
intelligible '27 since rights benefit persons rather than things. Ac-
cordingly, the legislative declaration that predial servitudes must
confer an advantage on the dominant estate ought to be taken as
a metaphor. It merely means that predial servitudes may not be
stipulated in favor of a named person, but must be stipulated in
favor of anyone who happens to be owner of the dominant estate.
Modern civil codes have eliminated analytical difficulties by
providing expressly that predial servitudes must confer an ad-
vantage on the owner of the dominant estate.2
In addition to prohibiting services in favor of a named per-
son, articles 709 of the Louisiana Civil Code and 686 of the French
Civil Code give expression to the traditional idea that rights
which have no direct relationship with the use or exploitation of
the dominant estate may not be stipulated in the form of pre-
dial servitudes.29 The same idea is expressed in the legislative
definition of the content of predial servitudes in the Civil Codes
of Germany and Greece. 30 Traditional ideas incorporated in
modern civil codes, however, must be interpreted in the light
of contemporary conditions, without regard to the narrow appli-
cations sanctioned by Roman jurisconsults. Accordingly, today,
all kinds of rights that have a direct relationship with the use
or exploitation of an immovable may be stipulated as predial
servitudes. The rights to take a walk, to collect fruits or flowers,
to enjoy a swimming pool or a tennis court,31 and use certain
facilities32 on the land of another may have a direct relationship
26. Cf. 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 165 (1833); 1 DEMANTE, COORS DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 329 (1830); J. PARDESSUS, TRAITII DES SERVITUDES 24 (1817);
2 MARCAD]I, EXPLICATION THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 634 (1886).
27. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANgAIS 921 (2d ed. Picard
1952).
28. See BGB § 1018; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 1118.
29. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 922
(2d ed. Picard 1952); 3 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 88 (6th ed. Esmein
1938); Civ., July 2, 1946, D. 1947.1.405, Note by Ripert, S. 1947.1.60.
30. See BGB § 1018; GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 1118-1119.
31. See 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 168 (1833); G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY 299 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek). But see 3 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAIS 88 (6th ed. Esmein 1938); 6 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITI TH2I0RIQUE
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 806 (3d ed. Chauveau 1905).
32. See Req., July 6, 1874, D. 1875.1.372, S. 1875.1.108 (the vendor of a
mill may validly reserve a predial servitude in favor of his estate for
the grinding of grain into flour needed for the household). Of course, similar
reservations in favor of named persons and their heirs or assigns would
have created merely personal obligations. See Req., March 23, D. 1908.1.279;
Paul, June 16, 1890, S. 1892.2.313.
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with the use or exploitation of an immovable; hence, they may
be stipulated as predial servitudes."3
Question has arisen whether fishing or hunting rights may
form the object of a predial servitude. According to the prevailing
view in France3 4 and in Greece3 5 these rights involve a strictly
personal gratification for the beneficiary; hence, they may not be
stipulated as predial servitudes. Nevertheless, argument may be
made that the French, Greek, and Louisiana Civil Codes allow the
creation of fishing or hunting servitudes in favor of the owner
of an estate destined to the pursuit of fishing or hunting opera-
tions.36 In Germany, however, the creation of hunting servitudes
is forbidden by special legislation whereas fishing rights may
form the object of real charges under applicable local laws.3 7
In all legal systems under consideration, fishing or hunting rights
may be leased for extensive periods of time; and since the validi-
ty of the lease is not affected by subsequent changes of owner-
ship, the lessee is adequately protected. The question of the avail-
ability of fishing or hunting servitudes has thus mostly academic
significance.
Questions whether restraints on trade and on the use or
alienation of immovables may form the object of predial servi-
tudes are discussed in the following sections.
2. Restraints on trade
Reasonable restraints on trade, as prohibitions against com-
petition and agreements providing for the delivery of certain
quotas of natural, agricultural, or industrial products, may un-
doubtedly establish personal obligations between the contracting
33. Likewise, the right to take wood for the heating of a house may be
stipulated as a predial servitude. See Civ., April 15, 1833, S. 1833.1.278; of.
Colmar, Oct. 15, 1930, S. 1932.2.108, Note by G~ny; Ledoux v. Allegre, 10
La. Ann. 706 (1855). Whether a juridical act is intended to create a per-
sonal obligation, a permissible predial servitude, a sui generis real right,
or a reprobated predial servitude, may be a question of contractual or
testamentary interpretation.
34. Cf. 3 AUBRY ET RAU, DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIs 88 (6th ed. Esmein 1938);
6 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITIt TH ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 806 (3d ed.
Chauveau 1905); 4 Huc, COMMENTAIRE THAORIQUE HT PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL
497 (1893); Civ., July 2, 1946, D. 1947.405, Note by Ripert, S. 1947.160; Req.,
May 16, 1933, D.H. 1933.345; Req., Nov. 14, 1932, S. 1932.1.388; Crim., Jan. 5,
1907, S. 1912.1.419; Crim., Jan. 9, 1891, D. 1891.1.89, S. 1891.1.489.
35. G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 299 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
36. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 926(2d ed. Picard 1952); 7 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 170 (2d ed.
1876).
37. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 298, 302 (10th ed. 1957).
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parties.38 Modern demands of business and finance, however, have
given rise to the question whether such stipulations may also
form the object of real rights in the form of predial servitudes
imposed on, or in favor of, lands destined to commercial or indus-
trial use.
Prohibitions against competition. Louisiana courts have not
as yet been faced squarely with the issue whether prohibitions
against competition may validly be stipulated as real rights.
Vendors 9 and lessors40 of immovables have, at times, stipulated
that they shall not engage in a competitive business with the
purchaser or lessee; but such stipulations were intended by the
parties to create personal obligations of the vendors or lessors. In
Leonard v. Lavigne,41 a recorded lease provided that "the lessors
hereby bind and obligate themselves, their heirs and assigns
not to sell or lease all or part of the adjoining premises owned
by them to any other person, firm or corporation for the purpose
of engaging in a competitive business with this lessee." The ad-
joining premises were subsequently sold by the lessor to a third
person without mention of the restriction in the act of sale. When
the new owners started erecting a competitive business on their
land, the lessee sought an injunction. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the stipulation in the contract of lease gave rise
to a personal obligation. In the absence of a dominant estate, the
stipulation could not establish a predial servitude; and, in the
absence of a general development plan in a subdivision, it could
not give rise to a sui generis real right in the nature of a valid
building restriction. It is submitted that the solution ought to be
the same even if the prohibition against competition had been
stipulated in favor of an estate rather than a lessee. Prohibitions
against competition should not be allowed to restrict the use of
38. See, e.g., Wintz v. Vogt, 3 La. Ann. 16 (1848); Desselle v. Petrossi,
207 So.2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
39. See, e.g., Simmons v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). In
this case, the vendor of an immovable obligated himself not to enter into
competition with the purchaser in the restaurant business. Subsequently, he
built a restaurant and sold it to a competitor of the purchaser. In an action
for damages and for an injunction against the operation of the competitive
business, the court rightly held that the vendor had not violated his agree-
ment not to become a competitor of the purchaser.
40. See, e.g., Hebert v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 346, 7 So. 580, 581(1890): "Dupaty did not stipulate that no livery stable should be kept on
the balance of the property during plaintiff's lease, but that he would not
keep a livery stable himself directly or indirectly during that time. It was
not a burden that he placed upon the property itself, but an obligation that
he imposed upon himself."
41. 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964).
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lands in Louisiana; existing economic needs may be amply satis-
fied by means of personal obligations.
In France, courts have taken the view that contracts not to
compete may not give rise to real rights in the nature of predial
servitudes. Beneficiary of the prohibition against competition is
the owner of a commercial or industrial establishment rather
than the estate on which the establishment is located; moreover,
there is no direct relationship between the purpose of the in-
tended servitude and the use of the dominant estate.42 Thus,
prohibitions against the extraction of materials from the ground
in favor of competing establishments have been held to create
rights other than predial servitudes; 43 and an obligation assumed
by the vendor of lands not to sell other lands for the purposes
of a competitive business has been held to be personal obliga-
tion.44 In Germany and in Greece, however, agreements not to
compete may give rise to predial servitudes, provided that these
agreements serve the permanent destination of the dominant
estate.45 Thus, the prohibition of a competitive business on a
neighboring estate may constitute a predial servitude in favor
of an estate destined to serve permanently a specified commercial
or industrial use, as a department store, a filling station, or a
factory.46 But if the dominant estate is used as an office building
for physicians or attorneys, a stipulation prohibiting the use of a
neighboring building for similar purposes would not create a
predial servitude. The building of the dominant estate is not
destined to a specified commercial or industrial use; it may also
be used as office space for accountants, commercial agents, or
brokers. The object of the servitude would thus be a benefit
attributed to the owner of the dominant estate rather than to the
permanent destination of the immovable.4 7
42. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI9 PRATIQUE DE DRO1T CIVIL FRANgAIS 924 (2d
ed. Picard 1952).
43. Amiens, Feb. 19, 1851, D. 1851.2.109; Req., July 8, 1851, D. 1851.1.188,
S. 1851.1.599; Grenoble, Dec. 27, 1888, JOURNAL DES COURS DE GRENOBLE ET
CHAMBtRY 180 (1889).
44. Civ., Nov. 27, 1907, D. 1908.1.460, S. 1909.1.262; cf. Req., Jan. 17, 1898,
D. 1898.1.324, S. 1901.1.130, nn.52-55.
45. See 3 STAUDINGER-RING, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB 1048 (11th ed. 1963); G.
BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 296 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
46. See R.G., July 6, 1939, 161 RGZ 90 (1939) (prohibition of operation of
a power station in competition with the power station on the dominant
estate).
47. Cf. OLG Miinchen, August 9, 1957, 10 NJW 1765 (1957). In this case,
there was a prohibition against the operation of a retail bakery store in
competition with a similar store on the dominant estate. The court held that
this prohibition could not give rise to a predial servitude. The store on the
dominant estate was not permanently destined to a specified commercial
[Vol. 30
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Quota requirements. Agreements providing for the purchase
or sale of certain quotas of agricultural or industrial products
may not form the object of real rights. These agreements involve
the performance of affirmative acts, and, therefore, may properly
form the object of personal obligations only.48 The question has
been discussed extensively in Germany. Courts in that country
have consistently refused to recognize as predial servitudes con-
tracts imposing on business establishments the obligation to sell
or to purchase exclusively the products of a certain manufacturer
or producer. 49 These contracts do not establish predial servitudes
in Germany because, in addition to imposing affirmative duties
contrary to law, they contemplate the prohibition of juridical
acts rather than purely physical acts; 0 moreover, they limit one's
freedom to do business which is an attribute of personality rather
than of the ownership of land.51 French courts, however held that
charges involving the delivery of certain quantities of natural
products needed for the operation of industrial establishments
may be given the form of predial servitudes, provided that there
is a direct relationship between the purpose of the servitude and
the use of the dominant estate. Thus, predial servitudes may be
established for the delivery of dirt,52 stones, 5  or coal5 4 to fac-
tories; and according to at least one decision, the delivery of
hydro-electric energy may become the object of a predial servi-
use, and might be used for purposes other than the distribution of bakery
products. It would have been otherwise if there were a fully equipped
bakery industry on the premises; but, under the circumstances, the owner
of the bakery store could have stipulated only a personal obligation or a
limited personal servitude in his favor.
48. See Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59
So. 403 (1912).
49. The question has frequently arisen in connection with quota require-
ments imposed by oil companies and beer breweries on distributors of their
products. Private owners of filling stations and beer bars are ordinarily de-
pendent on manufacturers for loans and cash advances. As a part of the
consideration for the opening of credit, manufacturers would be interested
in securing market outlets by means of predial servitudes. Courts and
writers, however, are generally in agreement that quota requirements may
not form the object of predial servitudes. See F. BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES
SACHENRECHTS 264 (2d ed. 1963); 3 STAUDINGER-RING, KOMMENTAR ZuM B.G.B.
1048 (11th ed. 1963); PALANDT-HocHE, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 939 (22d ed.
1963); 3 SOEROEL-SIEBERT-BAUR, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 378 (9th ed. 1960);
WESTERMANN, SACHENRECHT 607 (4th ed. 1960); but see MEISNER-STERN-HODES,
NACHBARRECHT 399 (3d ed. 1956).
50. See Bay. OLG, Nov. 21, 1958, 13 MDR 220 (1959).
51. See BGH, Jan. 30, 1959, 29 BGHZ 244, 247 (1959); BGH, Dec. 6, 1961, 15
NJW 486 (1962).
52. Civ., April 15, 1833, S. 1833.1.278.
53. Req., May 15, 1877, S. 1877.1.296. But cf. Req., Dec. 24, 1894, D. 1895.1.118,
S. 1898.1.523.
54. Civ. Jan. 9, 1901.1.450, S. 1901.1.169.
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tude.55 These solutions have been justified on the ground that
the duties imposed on the owner of the servient estate are merely
incidental to the lawful purpose and content of the servitude.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that these solutions will ever be ex-
tended by analogy to agreements imposing on business establish-
ments the obligation to sell or to purchase the agricultural or
industrial products of a certain manufacturer.
3. Restraints on alienation
According to traditional civilian precepts, juridical acts im-
posing restraints on the alienation of immovable property give
rise to personal obligations only.56 These obligations are enforce-
able against the original obligor and his universal successors, that
is, heirs, universal legatees, or legatees under universal title.57
Third persons,5 8 and particular successors of the obligor, that is,
buyers, donees, or legatees of particular things,59 are not bound
to respect the obligatory relationship between the obligor and
the obligee,6 0 unless, of course, they are made parties to the re-
55. Pau, Feb. 14, 1912, D. 1913.2.99, S. 1912.2.249, Note by Bonnecase.
56. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL
96 (1959); 1 JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANgAIS 956 (1932); 4 HuC,
COMMENTAIRE TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 103-106 (1893); 11 LAURENT,
PRINCIPES DR DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 601 (1876). See also BGB § 137; ENNECCERUS-
NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 891 (15th ed. 1960);
GREEK CIV. CODE art. 177; G. BALLs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 179 (7th
ed. 1955) (in Greek).
57. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556(28): "The universal successor represents
the person of the deceased, and succeeds to all his rights and charges."
Restraints on alienation are heritable obligations. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1997,
1999. For a general discussion of the notion, incidents, and effects of per-
sonal obligations, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 88, 114 (1966).
58. It is a fundamental principle of civil law that personal obligations are
without effect on third persons: res inter alios acta alliis non nocet. See LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1889: "No one can, by a contract in his own name, bind any
one but himself or his representatives . . ."; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1165; cf. 1
LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at 263 (1937): "The
rule is, that contracts neither avail nor injure any but the parties." For
general discussion, see A. WEILL, LA RELATIVIT]l DES CONVENTIONS EN DROIT
PRIVfI FRANgAIS 1-27 (1939); 1 PLANIOL, TRAITh tL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 114
(10th ed. Ripert 1925).
59. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1179, 1780, 1797. Bee also id. art. 3556(28): "The
particular successor succeeds only to the rights appertaining to the thing
which is sold, ceded or bequeathed to him"; 10 DURANTON, COUaS DE DROIT
FRANgAIS 259 (1834): "Successors by particular title ... merely have the rights
that their author had. They are not bound by his personal obligations, but
must tolerate the exercise of real rights which he has Imposed on the object
for the benefit of third persons. In one word, habent causam auctoris sui
propter rem."
60. It follows from the principle of relativity of personal obligations that
contractual remedies are unavailable against third persons. According to
modern trends, however, the interference with a contractual relationship
may give rise to delictual actions. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
§ 88 (1966).
1969] REAL RIGHTS
lationship by their own consent.61 As a rule, therefore, transfers
of immovable property by particular title ought to be valid in
spite of the violation of restraints on alienation imposed by jurid-
ical acts.6 2
This traditional approach attributes excessive significance to
the general interest in the free alienability of property.63 It fails
to recognize that, at least in exceptional circumstances, the gen-
eral interest in the free alienability of property should be bal-
anced against the interest of individuals to dispose of their prop-
erty under modifications that contemporary needs dictate. 64 In-
deed, in the framework of a well-defined public policy, individ-
uals may have legitimate claims for the enforcement of reason-
able restraints on alienation against anyone and in the annul-
ment of unauthorized transfers of immovable property.6 5 This
may be accomplished in civil law jurisdictions either by strain-
ing the notion of personal obligations or by attributing to re-
straints on alienation the character of real rights, which, by their
nature, are effective against anyone. 66
61. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 1890.
62. Of. BGB § 137; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 177. In case of a threatened
violation of a restraint on alienation imposed by juridical act, the obligee's
remedy in Germany and in Greece is an injunction brought against the
obligor or his universal successors. After violation, the obligee's remedy is
ordinarily an action for damages brought likewise against the obligor or
his universal successors. Exceptionally, however, the law may provide that
an alienation in violation of a restraint imposed by juridical act may be
null. See ENNECCERUS-NPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BURGERLICHEN 891 (15th
ed. 1960); G. BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAw 179 (7th ed. 1955) (in
Greek). When a restraint on alienation is coupled with a resolutory condi-
tion, an attempted transfer of the property is ineffective by virtue of the
resolutory condition rather than the prohibition of alienation. Of. LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2013.
63. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 491: "Perfect ownership gives the right to use,
to enjoy and to dispose of one's property in the most unlimited manner,
provided that it is not used in any way prohibited by law'or ordinances";
FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 544; BGB § 903; GREEK Civ. CODE art. 1000.
64. Cf. LA. CIrv. CODE art. 2013: "The real obligation, created by condition
annexed to the alienation of real property, is susceptible of all the modifica-
tions that the will of the parties can suggest, except such as are forbidden
by law." There are no corresponding provisions in the Civil Codes of France,
Germany, or Greece.
65. Cf. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 727, 67 So. 641,
642 (1915): "[Ilt would be unfortunate if our system of land tenure were
so hidebound, or if the public policy of the general government or of the
state were so narrow, as to tender impracticable a scheme such as the one
in question in this case, whereby an owner has sought to dispose of his
property advantageously to himself and beneficially to the city wherein it
lies."
66. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 93-97 (1957). In common law jurisdictions,
chancery courts faced with the problem of the validity of restrictions con-
cerning use of lands among persons other than the original contracting
parties gradually fashioned old institutions of contract law into a doctrine
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In a leading decision, Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux,6 7
the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that a restriction of limit-
ed duration on the landowner's right to alienate property to per-
sons of a particular race was valid and enforceable as a charge
on the land. The three elements of the right of ownership, the
usus, fructus, and abusus, the court reasoned, are susceptible of
subdivision within certain limits prescribed by rules of public
policy. Thus, whereas absolute or perpetual restraints on aliena-
tion are invalid, 68 restraints of limited duration imposed by per-
sons having a substantial interest69 are valid and enforceable
against any acquirer of the land with notice.70 Restrictions on the
right to alienate property to persons of a particular race, religion,
or nationality are no longer valid;71 but restraints on alienation
imposed on other grounds may still give rise to veritable real
rights in Louisiana. 72 In case of an impending violation, the
of covenants running with the land. See Comment, 33 TUL. L. REV. 822, 826
(1959). See also 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 161 (1962); C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANTS 93-94 (1947).
67. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915). See also Bolian v. Porche, 149 So. 272
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933); Comment, 8 TUL. L. REV. 262 (1933).
68. See Female Orphan Society v. Y.M.C.A., 119 La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907);
Succession of Franklin, 7 La. Ann. 395 (1852); Henderson v. Rost, 5 La. Ann.
441 (1850).
69. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 730, 67 So.
641, 643 (1915): "The question of how far such a condition will be sustained
is one dependent very much upon the facts of each particular case. If the
condition is founded upon no substantial reason but merely in caprice, and
is of a character to tie up property to the detriment of the public interest,
it will not be sustained; otherwise, it will." The narrow holding of the case
is that reasonable restraints on alienation may validly be imposed by an
ancestor in title who wishes to secure a general development plan for a sub-
division. In this respect, a restraint on alienation may be likened to a build-
ing restriction. According to dicta, however, and under the ratio decidendi,
reasonable restraints on alienation may be validly imposed by any person
having a legitimate interest, for example, a testator. For corresponding de-
velopments in France, see text at note 80 infra.
70. In Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915),
the restraint on alienation had been inserted in the act by which the
property was acquired by defendant. The acquirer, however, may be
charged with notice by virtue of the public records doctrine. See LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 2264-2266; LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950); MeDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152,
51 So. 100 (1909); cf. text at notes 124-129 infra.
71. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The United States Supreme
Court has held that judicial proceedings enforcing discriminatory covenants
constitute actions in deprivation of the equal protection of laws under the
Constitution. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
72. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 727, 737, 67 So. 641,
646 (1915): "This right thus withheld from him [i.e., the right of alienation]
is part of the ownership; a dismemberment of it. ... It might be argued,
of course, that restraints on alienation form real obligations under article
2013 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Real obligations, however, are not
an independent category of real rights under the Code but merely the
passive side of all real rights. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
§ 115 (1966).
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restraint may be enforced by an action for injunction 3 brought
by the person who imposed the restraint or by persons in whose
favor the restraint was imposed. 4 After violation, depending on
the facts and circumstances of each case, a proper plaintiff may
demand damages, 75 resolution of the original transfer of the prop-
erty,7 6 or merely annulment of the alienation made in violation
of the restraint.7 7
In France, restraints on alienation may not be stipulated as
predial servitudes because the advantage of the restraint is at-
tributed to a person rather than an estate.7 8 According to a well-
settled jurisprudence, however, which has no direct foundation
on the Code Civil,7 9 restraints of limited duration, imposed by
persons having a legitimate interest, are effective against third
73. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3601.
74. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67 So. 641,
646 (1915): "[Ihf these occupants of the other lots in the subdivision were
the parties plaintiff in the suit . . . . [tiheir remedy would seem to have
to be restricted to injunction . . . and damages." The court based its con-
clusion on the ground that the restraint was "a sort of stipulation pour
autrui."
75. Id.
76. Any transfer of property may be made subject to an express resolu-
tory condition. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2013. But, at least in onerous transfers
of property, a restraint on alienation may be regarded as an implied resolu-
tory condition. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67
So. 641, 646 (1915): "This stipulation was an essential feature in the scheme
of the company; therefore, obviously, the company would not have been
willing to enter into contract without it, and, as a consequence, it constitutes
a resolutory condition." Resolution, however, ought to be available only
when actions for injunction or damages do not afford adequate relief. See
also Hebert & Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1988, 1 LA. L. REV. 80,
113 (1939).
77. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 738, 67 So. 641,
646 (1915): "The defendant Cazeaux may be able, however, to obtain from
his vendee a cancellation of the sale by which this condition has been
breached, and may prefer to do so rather than have the sale by the company
to himself dissolved. The property may, perhaps, have increased in value.
The court is at liberty, in its discretion, to grant him time in which to do
this, and thereby avoid a dissolution of the sale." In cases involving inter
vivos or mortis causa donations of immovables subject to reasonable re-
straints on alienation, annulment of the alienation made in violation of the
restraint rather than resolution of the donation ought to be the rule. Pre-
sumably, a donor who imposes a restraint on alienation wishes that the
property remain in the patrimony of the donee. Hence, resolution of the
donation would be contrary to the intention of the donor and the best in-
terest of the donee. For extensive discussion of this problem in France, see
text at note 80 infra.
78. See Civ., Nov. 27, 1907, D. 1908.1.460, S. 1909.1.262 (prohibition of alien-
ation to a person planning to engage in a competitive business).
79. See Charon, La jurisprudence sur les clauses d'inalienbiltd, 5 REV.
TRiM. DR. Civ. 339, 340 (1906): "There is a radical, irreducible antinomy, be-
tween the law and the jurisprudence"; Tissier, Note, S. 1904.1.225, 226: "This
system has developed apart from the law, and in our opinion, contrary to
law." For a criticism of this jurisprudence, see 11 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 601-14 (1876); 4 HUC, COMMENTAIRE THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU COD CIVIL 103-06 (1893).
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persons in the sense that any alienation in violation of such a
restraint is a relative nullity. 0 Commentators have suggested
various constructions for the reconciliation of the jurisprudence
with the principles of the Code Civil. According to one view, re-
straints on alienation give rise to a personal incapacity to alien-
ate."' This view, however, conflicts with article 1123 of the Code
Civil (corresponding to article 1782 of the Louisiana Civil Code),
which forbids limitations on the contractual capacity of any
person. According to a second view, restraints on alienation give
rise to personal obligations not to do.8 2 Any alienation in violation
of such an obligation may allegedly be set aside by application
of article 1143 of the Code Civil (corresponding to article 1928 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870), which declares that "the
obligee may require that any thing which has been done in viola-
tion of a contract, may be undone. '83 It has been aptly observed,
however, that article 1143 of the Code Civil contemplates merely
the undoing of material acts; it has nothing to do with the an-
nulment of juridical acts.8 4 According to a third view, which is
the prevailing one today, restraints on alienation give rise to
sui generis real rights.8 5
In Germany and in Greece, restraints on alienation may form
the object of personal obligations but not of predial servitudes"6
or other real rights.87 According to the applicable principles of
the law of obligations, alienations made in violation of restraints
80. See Thomas, Des clauses portant defense d'alidner, de cdder, ou de
saisir dans les dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires, 32 REV. GON. DR.
39, 117, 241 (1908); Ch6ron, La jurisprudence sur les clauses d'inaliabilitd, 5
REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 339 (1906).
81. See 1 JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANgAIS 956 (2d. 1932).
82. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, TRAITA DE DROIT
CIVIL 96 (1959).
83. See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1143; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1928.
84. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 237 n.2
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
85. See 2 MARTY ET REYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 70 (1965); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 230 (2d ed. Picard 1952); 4 BEUDANT
ET LEREROURS-PIGEONNItRE, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 289 (2d ed. Voirin
1938); 11 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 196, n.37 septies (5th ed. Bartin
1919); Tissier, Note, S. 1904.1.225. For a dogmatic analysis, see BEraud,
L'indisponibilitd juridique, D. 1952. Chr. 187.
86. See MEISNER-STERN-HODES, NACHBARRECHT 395 (3d ed. 1956); G. BALLS,
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 300 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
87. In Germany and in Greece, the principles of contractual and testa-
mentary freedom have only limited applications in the field of property law.
The number and incidents of real rights are specified in the law, and the
creation of real rights other than those established by legislation is excluded.
Interested parties, however, are free to work modifications on recognized real
rights when the law so provides. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
§§ 117, 118 (1966).
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imposed by juridical acts are valid, unless the law establishes
some exception.8 8
4. Restraints on the use of immovables; building restrictions
According to traditional civilian precepts, restraints on the
use of immovables may form either personal obligations or servi-
tudes89 Contemporary developments in Louisiana and in France,
however, have brought into focus the question whether restraints
on the use of immovables may also form sui generis real rights
distinct and distinguishable from servitudes.90 Perhaps due to the
inadequacy of building and zoning ordinances to meet demands
for the preservation and enhancement of property values, land-
owners and developers of land in the two countries since the
turn of the century have imposed restrictions limiting the future
use of immovables to certain specified purposes, prohibiting the
erection of certain types of structures, or specifying the type and
value of buildings to be erected.91
Certain types of restraints on the use of immovables may be
stipulated everywhere as predial servitudes, provided that the
essential requirements for the creation of predial servitudes are
met. Thus, an estate may be charged in favor of another estate
88. See BGB § 137; GREEK Civ. CODE art. 177; ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BYRGERLICHEN RECHTS 891 (5th ed. 1960); G. BALIS,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 179 (7th ed. 1955) (in Greek).
89. See Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59
So. 403 (1912). See also Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929);
cf. Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964). A restraint on the
use of an immovable imposed in favor of another immovable should be
qualified as a predial servitude; a similar restraint established In favor of a
person might be qualified as a limited personal servitude. On the freedom
of interested parties to create personal servitudes other than usufruct, use,
or habitation, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §§ 123, 125 (1968).
Restraints on the use of immovables that may qualify as servitudes are en-
forceable against anyone as charges on the land. In contrast, personal obli-
gations are enforceable against the original obligor and his universal suc-
cessors, i.e., heirs, universal legatees, or legatees under universal title. They
are not enforceable against particular successors, i.e., buyers, donees, or
legatees of particular things, unless expressly assumed. See LA. Civ. CODE
art. 3556(28); Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929); Herzberg
v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958); Murphy v. Marino, 60
So.2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952); LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1949); A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 104, 113 (1966).
90. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 104 (1966). For a general
discussion concerning the freedom of individuals to create real rights other
than those recognized in the Civil Codes, see id. §§ 87, 96.
91. See Comments, 21 LA. L. REV. 468 (1961), 33 TUL. L. REV. 822 (1959).
For corresponding developments In France, see 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 923 (2d ed. Picard 1952); Req., Oct. 28, 1938,
GAZ. PAL. 1938.2.839; Req. Feb. 5, 1934, GAz. PAL. 1934.1.724; Civ., May 5, 1919,
D. 1923.1.230.
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with restrictions pertaining to the height of buildings,92 buildings
set off from property lines, 93 and the exclusion of commercial or
industrial uses.94 But restraints involving affirmative acts, as
those concerning the type and value of buildings to be erected,
may not properly form the object of predial servitude.95 Never-
theless, landowners who acquired or alienated property in reli-
ance upon restrictions that may not give rise to predial servitudes
may have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of these re-
strictions against any violator. In order to afford protection in
appropriate cases, French courts have occasionally strained the
notion of personal obligations9 whereas Louisiana courts have
developed a body of law dealing with "building restrictions"97
as distinct species of real rights.
92. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 728(3); Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 30
So. 102 (1901); FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 689; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI5
PRATIQUE DP DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIs no 923 (2d ed. Picard 1952); GREEK CIV. CODE
art. 1120; G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 315 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); cf. BGB
§ 1018; MEISNER-STERN-IODES, NACHBARRECHT 395 (3d ed. 1965). In Roman law,
this servitude was known as servitus non. altius tollendi. See W. BUCKLAND,
A TEXT-BOoi OF ROMAN LAW 264 (2d ed. 1950).
93. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 728(3), which,, by clear implication, authorizes
the creation of such servitudes. Interested parties, however, ordinarily im-
pose set-off limitations in the form of building restrictions, i.e., sui generis
real rights, rather than in the form of predial servitudes. For France,
Germany, and Greece, see Req., Oct. 28, 1938, GAZ. PAL. 1938.2.839; Req., Feb.
5, 1934, GAZ. PAL. 1934.1.724; Civ., May 5, 1919, D. 1923.1.230; MEISNER-STERN-
HODEs, NACHBARRECHT 396 (3d ed. 1956); G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 300 (3d
ed. 1955) (in Greek).
94. See McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960), involving a
veritable predial servitude prohibiting commercial usage of the servient
estate; of. Holloway v. Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43 So.2d 673 (1949), involving
similar limitations in the form of building restrictions. French courts have
held, with the approval of doctrinal writers, that the exclusion of com-
mercial or industrial usage may form the object of a predial servitude. See
Civ., June 30, 1936, D. 1938.1.65, Note by Besson; Paris, June 6, 1930, GAz.
TIns. 1930.2.191, 29 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 1110 (1930); Paris, March 27, 1924, D.H.
1924.398; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n ° 923
(2d ed. Picard 1952); cf. Civ., March 29, 1933, GAz. PAL. 1933.2.42 (restraints
on the use of immovables may form the object of predial servitudes but
there must be an express stipulation that the restraints are imposed in
favor of another estate); Note, Solus, 32 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 904 (1933).
Contra: Bruxelles, March 1, 1909, S. 1909.4.15 (the prohibition of commercial
or industrial usage may form the object of personal obligations only). For
Germany and Greece, see F. BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 264 (2d ed.
1963); G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 300, 313 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
95. See Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929); but cf. 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT2 PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS n 923 (2d ed. Picard
1952); Civ. May 5, 1919, D. 1923.1.230 (affirmative duties incidental to the servi-
tude).
96. See, e.g., Civ., Dec. 12, 1899, D. 1900.1.361, Note by G6ny (clauses re-
lieving the operator of a mine from liability for damage to the surface are
obligations effective against third persons).
97. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 468 (1961). In this respect, courts had to
balance the demands of a firmly established policy opposing restrictions on
the use and alienability of property with the requirements of contractual
freedom and the right of individuals to dispose of their property as they
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Building restrictions constitute the most important category
of restraints on the use or disposition of immovables from the
viewpoints of urban and suburban developments in Louisiana.
They have been defined as limitations "inserted in deeds in
pursuance of a general plan devised by the ancestor in title to
maintain certain building standards and uniform improve-
ments .. ". ."9, The requirements of an ancestor in title and of a
general development plan are essential features of building re-
strictions as sui generis real rights. Unlike predial servitudes
under the Civil Code, building restrictions may involve certain
affirmative duties9 and may exclude the performance of certain
judicial acts, as alienation to certain classes of persons; 10 0 more-
over, building restrictions may be imposed. even in the absence
of a dominant estate.'
0
'
Nature of building restrictions. The matter of classification
please. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 491, 1764 cf. Female Orphan Society v. Young
Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907); Comment, 8 TUL. L. REV.
262 (1933).
98. See Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 666, 30 So.2d 678, 679 (1947), and
cases there cited. According to firmly established Louisiana jurisprudence,
building restrictions constitute real rights only in the framework of sub-
division planning. They must be imposed, at least by implication, in favor
of lots in a subdivision in accordance with a general development plan. See
text at note 118 infra. If the restrictions are imposed on individual lots with-
out regard to a general development plan, they may constitute veritable
predial servitudes, provided, of course, that the requirements for the crea-
tion of predial servitudes are met. See McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125
So.2d 154 (1960) (restriction of commercial usage imposed on a single lot in
favor of another lot). If the requirements for the creation of predial servi-
tudes are not met, the restrictions may only be personal obligations. See
Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964); Cambais v. Douglas,
167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929); LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1949). But see Tucker v. Woodside, 53 So.2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir.,
1951), criticized in A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 114 (1966). This
isolated decision, deviating from well-established principles of property law,
should be regarded as confined to its own facts.
99. See. e.g., restrictions as to the value of buildings to be erected: Ed-
wards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Ouachita Home Site &
Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938); Cunningham v. Hall, 148
So.2d 808 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958); and, as to the type of buildings to be erected, see, e.g.,
Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947); Rabouin v. Dutrey, 181
La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935); Willis v. New Orleans East Unit of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Inc., 156 So.2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Community Builders,
Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
100. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641
(1915); of. Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961); McGuffy v.
Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Rabouin v. Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160
So. 393 (1935); Bolian v. Porche, 149 So. 272 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933); but
cf. text at note 71 supra.
101. See text at note 111 infra. Restrictions imposed by subdivider prior
to the creation of a subdivision do not qualify as predial servitudes because
the requirement of two estates is not met. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 649. After
the first lot Is sold, however, restrictions involving passive duties may cer-
tainly constitute veritable predial servitudes. See note 98 supra.
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of building restrictions has given rise to analytical difficulties in
Louisiana. In one line of cases, building restrictions are likened
to predial servitudes 0 2 under article 728 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870.103 This classification, however, may properly apply
to building restrictions involving prohibition of material acts in
favor of a dominant estate; it may not apply to restrictions in-
volving affirmative duties. 04 In a second line of cases, building
restrictions are termed real obligations accompanying the land
in the hands of any acquirer. This classification allegedly rests
on article 2012 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.105 According to
accurate analysis, however, real obligations are not an indepen-
dent category of rights but merely the passive side of all real
rights. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the
enumeration of real obligations in article 2012 is exclusive rather
than merely illustrative; 10 and, since building restrictions are
not mentioned in that article, they should not be classified as real
obligations. Finally, in a third line of cases, building restrictions
have been classified as covenants running with the land. 0 7 This
is common law terminology deriving from institutions so foreign
to civil law property that its continued use may only result in
confusion. 08 The common law doctrine of covenants running
102. See, e.g., Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d
360 (1968); McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Holloway v.
Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43 So.2d 673 (1949); Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co.
v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938). Quite frequently, however, Louisiana
courts use the expressions "real obligations" and "covenants running with
the land" as equivalents to predial servitudes. See, e.g., Clark v. Reed, 122
So.2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (building restrictions termed "servitudes,
real rights or obligations, or covenants running with the land").
103. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 728(3): "Non-apparent servitudes are such as
have no exterior sign of their existence; such, for instance, as the prohibi-
tion of building on an estate, or of building above a particular height." This
article is merely illustrative of permissible servitudes affecting buildings.
104. Thus, in Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a contract imposing affirmative duties
gives rise to personal obligations rather than servitudes.
105. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2012; Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d
341 (1964); Salerno v. De Lucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947); cf. Ouachita
Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938) ('real obli-
gations" which "may be likened to servitudes"). -
106. See Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929). SeV also A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 115 (1966).
107. See, e.g., Hill v. Wm. P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928);
Harris v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 330 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); cf. Pizzolato v.
Cataldo, 202 La. 675, 12 So.2d 677 (1943). See also Queensborough Land Co.
v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
108. See Comment, 33 TUL. L. REV. 822 (1959). In Leonard v. Lavigne,
245 La. 1004, 1007, 162 So.2d 341, 342 (1964), the lower court had held that a
stipulation in a lease was a covenant running with the land. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed and stated tersely that "the appellate court . . .
relied primarily on the law universally obtaining in the common law states
.... While these rules of common law jurisprudence are sometimes per-
suasive, they are not controlling under our system of civil law."
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with the land dates back to the time when common law refused
to recognize the assignability of contractual rights and obliga-
tions.109 The development of the doctrine brought about a set, of
technical and sometimes artificial rules designed to determine the
existence of "privity of estate" and the question whether a cove-
nant "touches and concerns" land.110 Some of these rules have
been subjected to criticism in modern times as inapposite to con-
temporary demands."' It would thus be a mistake for Louisiana
courts to adopt this body of law in its entirety, with all its his-
torical coloring and artificialities, when they can turn to the Civil
Code for simpler solutions.
Preferably, building restrictions that may not qualify as
predial servitudes under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 should
be classified as sui generis real rights 1 2 akin to predial servitudes.
Thus, they should be governed by the general rules applicable
to predial servitudes, subject to any exceptions established by
special legislation or jurisprudence as to the creation, enforce-
ment or termination of building restrictions.
Creation of building restrictions. Building restrictions are
ordinarily created by developers of land who intend to subdivide
their property into individual lots destined to residential, com-
mercial, or industrial uses. After the establishment of a sub-
division, however, landowners may occasionally enter into agree-
ments designed to restrict the use of their property."38 Unlike re-
strictions created by developers of land, which do not qualify as
veritable servitudes due to the absence of a dominant estate,
restrictions imposed by landowners after the creation of a sub-
division may qualify either as predial servitudes 1 4 or as sui
generis real rights. 1 5
109. Cf. 2 AMERICAN LAW Of PROPERTY § 9.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
110. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory notes at 3150 (1944).
111. Cf., e.g., C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS ch. IV (1929).
112. See, e.g., Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961) (real
rights running with the land); Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661
(1941); Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
113. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 468, (1961).
114. Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d 360
(1968).
115. Outside of subdivision planning, agreements among landowners
imposing restrictions on individual lots in favor of other lots may give rise
to veritable predial servitudes. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 646, 709; McGuffy v.
Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960) (restriction affecting a single lot).
The Civil Code specifically permits the creation of a servitude on one estate
in favor of several estates or of servitudes on several estates in favor of one
estate. See LA. CIV. CODE: art. 745. Agreements among landowners imposing
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In the past, building restrictions were inserted by developers
of land in each individual act of transfer of property in a sub-
division. Today, however, building restrictions are ordinarily
contained in recorded notarial acts or are annexed to recorded
plats of subdivisions.' 1 6 Individual transfers of property then
incorporate by reference the recorded acts or plats." 7
The creation of building restrictions as sui generis real rights
is subject to the requirement that there be a general plan that
is feasible and capable of being preserved." 8 Thus, when restric-
tions are imposed by stipulations inserted in individual acts
of sale, care should be taken to impose uniform restrictions on
most, if not all, individual lots in the subdivision. Omission to
make the restrictions uniform" 9 or to insert them in a sub-
stantial number of sales 20 may be taken to indicate failure of
a general development plan. In these circumstances, the stipula-
tions establishing the restrictions may create personal obliga-
tions rather than sui generis real rights. 12 1
By analogy to continuous and non-apparent servitudes,
building restrictions must be created by title. 22 which, in order
restrictions on their property in the framework of subdivision planning con-
stitute building restrictions, i.e., sui generis real rights, rather than predial
servitudes. See Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d
360 (1968); cf. Pizzolato v. Cataldo, 202 La. 675, 12 So.2d 677 (1943). Since
the rules governing building restrictions as sui generis real rights differ in
certain particulars from the rules governing predtal servitudes, question may
arise as to the precise nature of the rights created by the agreement among
landowners. This is a matter of contractual interpretation, resolved in the
light of the facts of each case and in accordance with the intention of the
parties.
116. See, e.g., Community Builders Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963); Clark v. Reed, 122 So.2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); cf.
McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
117. See, e.g., Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949); cf.
Begnaud v. Hill, 109 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
118. See Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d 360
(1938); Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947); Alfortish v.
Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942); Community Builders, Inc. v.
Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Olivier v. Berggren 136
So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). In the absence of a general plan, however,
the building restrictions may constitute veritable predial servitudes. See
McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
119. See Murphy v. Marino, 60 So.2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952).
120. See In re Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130
So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (restrictions on 40 percent of the lots;
failure of plan); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958);
Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); cf. Rabouin v.
Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935).
121. See In re Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130
So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958); LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1949); cf. Cambals v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929).
122. See McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); cf. Leonard v.
Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964).
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to be effective against third persons, must be recorded. 123 In this
respect, title means any juridical act: 124 hence, restrictions may
validly be established by declarations of intent made in the
act of sale to the present owner, to an ancestor,'1 25 or in a
separate document. 126 By virtue of the public records doctrine,
an acquirer of immovable property burdened with recorded
restrictions is presumed to have notice.127 Thus, the restrictions
need not appear in the act by which the present owner acquired
the property nor in his chain of title; it suffices that the restric-
tions were recorded in some form at the time the original sub-
divider conveyed the property to the ancestor of the present
owner. 128 It follows that in the absence of recorded restrictions
at the time of the first sale by the subdivider, the property is
transferred free from any restrictions;129 and if, after the first
sale, the subdivider imposes blanket restrictions by a recorded
123. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2264-2266; LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950); McDuffle v.
Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909); Clark v. Reed, 122 So.2d 344 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960); cf. Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d
360 (1968).
124. See McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 766, 125 So.2d 154, 157 (1960): "The
plaintiff attempts to equate 'title' as used in the article [766 of the 1870
Code] with the deed, or act of sale, by which the servient estate is acquired.
He contends that, in order to create the servitude, the restriction must be
incorporated in the deed conveying the land. Such a narrow construction,
necessarily, does violence to the codal provision . . . . The conclusion is In-
escapable that 'title' as used in Article 766 refers to the method by which
the servitude may be acquired and does not relate exclusively to the con-
veyance of the servient estate. It is a generic term which embraces any
juridical act."
125. See, e.g., Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179
So. 841 (1938).
126. See McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Clark v.
Reed, 122 So.2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); cf. Pizzolato v. Cataldo, 202 La.
675, 12 So.2d 677 (1943). If there has been no recordation of a general plan
nor restrictions in the chain of title, the use of the property is unrestricted
insofar as third persons are concerned. Holloway v. Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43
So.2d 673 (1949).
127. See Anderson v. Courtney, 190 So.2d 493, 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966):
"This court recognises the principle that the civil law favors the free use
and alienability of immovable property and that unless a purchaser is given
recorded notice of restrictions and impairment of use such purchaser cannot
be affected thereby." See also Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarborough, 149
So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Willis v. New Orleans East Unit of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., 156 So.2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
128. See McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Anderson v.
Courtney, 190 So.2d 493 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Clark v. Reed, 122 So.2d
344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
129. See Anderson v. Courtney, 190 So.2d 493, 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966):
"In the absence of recorded . . . covenants, the original purchasers of lots 5
and 6 acquired the usus, the fructus, and the abusus of these two lots of
ground in their purest and most complete forms, with all of the attributes
thereunto appertaining." See also Holloway v. Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43 So.2d
673 (1949).
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declaration of intent, the successors of the original acquirer are
not bound by these restrictions. 30
A prospective purchaser of immovable property, however,
is not charged with notice of recorded building restrictions affect-
ing the property.'l ' Accordingly, if existing restrictions were
not disclosed to him at the time of the conclusion of the contract
to sell, the contract is invalid because the title of the vendor
is not clear. 132 Moreover, if there is doubt as to the existence
or validity of building restrictions, the purchaser is entitled
to refuse specific performance because the title of the vendor
is suggestive of litigation.13 3 The vendor may not demand specific
performance on the grounds that existing restrictions have been
abandoned or terminated by prescription. A judgment deter-
mining these issues in an action for specific performance would
not be binding on third persons; and, after completion of the
sale, the purchaser might be subjected to litigation by persons
seeking to enforce the restrictions.134 Under the circumstances,
the best solution for the vendor is to seek additional time to
perfect his title by an action for declaratory judgment.135
Protection and enforcement of building restrictions. As real
rights burdening an immovable in favor of other immovables,
building restrictions involve an active side (right) and a passive
side (real obligation).13 The active side consists of the claim
of landowners whose property benefits from the restrictions to
have the enjoyment of their rights without interference from
anyone. The passive side consists of the duty of landowners
whose property is burdened to do nothing in violation of the
130. See Anderson v. Courtney, 190 So.2d 493, 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966):
"[W]hen these lots were alienated by the original subdivider of this land
without recorded notice of restrictions such restrictions cannot thereafter
be applied unless or until a vendor specifically imposes such restrictions in
his act of alienation." By analogy to the rules governing predial servitudes,
building restrictions imposed after the recordation of a real mortgage may
not "prejudice or diminish the rights of the mortgagee or any future
purchaser under a foreclosure sale." See Vernon v. Alphin, 98 So.2d 280, 284
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 750.
131. See Rabouln v. Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935); Oubre v.
Stassi, 56 So.2d 598 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
132. See cases cited at note 131 supra. See also Williams v. Meyer, 29
So.2d 599 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947); Bolian v. Porche, 149 So. 272 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1933); Hebert v. Succession of Vezoux, 126 So. 461 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1930); Giacoma v. Yochim, 126 So. 84 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
133. See Giacoma v. Yochim, 126 So. 84 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
134. See Oubre v. Stassi, 56 So.2d 598 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
135. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871-1873; McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125
So.2d 154 (1960).
136. For general discussion of the active and passive sides of real rights,
See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CivIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 88, 113 (1966).
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restrictions. It ought to follow, then, that actions for the pro-
tection and enforcement of building restrictions may be brought
against any violator 137 by the persons entitled to these "property
rights." 8
A decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, based mostly
on common law authorities, might be taken to indicate that
actions for the protection and enforcement of building restric-
tions may be brought only by landowners in the immediate
vicinity of the alleged violation.189 It would seem, however, that
any landowner in a subdivision is adversely affected by
violations,140 and has a substantive right as well as procedural
standing to bring action.141 Persons whose property is located
outside the restricted area may not sue for the enforcement of
building restrictions as sui generis real rights; 42 these persons,
however, may have claims for the enforcement of building
restrictions as personal obligations. 43 Dicta in a number of
Louisiana decisions might be taken to indicate that landowners
whose property is free of restrictions may not bring actions
to set aside violations on restricted property in the subdivision. 4 4
137. See, e.g., Finn v. Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954)
(action brought against the landowner whose property was bound by re-
strictions as well as against a contractor making works in violation of the
restrictions).
138. Willis v. New Orleans East Union of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., 156
So.2d 310, 313 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). Quite apart from property theory, the
building restrictions imposed by a subdivider constitute a tacit "stipulation
pour autrui" in favor of the purchasers of individual lots. Queensborough
Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67 So. 641, 646 (1915). Accordingly,
landowners in a subdivision may have recourse to both contractual and
property actions.
139. See Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1960); Comment,
21 LA. L. Rsv. 468 (1961).
140. The effect of violations of restrictions is bound to be felt, sooner or
later, in the entire subdivision. Accordingly, any landowner should be en-
titled to enforce the restrictions before they creep from distant parts of the
subdivision to the property next door. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 468 (1961).
141. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 681.
142. See Lillard v. Jet Homes, Inc., 129 So.2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961);
Begnaud v. Hill, 109 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959). This Is so because
building restrictions constitute sui generis real rights only in the framework
of subdivision development. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
143. An obligee may have recourse to contractual remedies for the viola-
tion of restrictions that constitute valid personal obligations, whether his
property is located inside or outside a subdivision. See In re Congregation
of St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130 So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961);
Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958); Murphy v.
Marino, 60 So.2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952); LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43
So.2d 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949); of. Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162
So.2d 341 (1964).
144. See, e.g., Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 210, 7 So.2d 708, 712
(1942): "[W]e notice that the defendant complains that two of the plaintiffs
.. .are without a right to maintain the present suit because the building
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It would seem, however, that restrictions may be imposed in
favor of any lot in a subdivision without the necessity of mutu-
ality of obligations. Hence, depending on the particular plan of
a subdivision, owners of unrestricted property may have "a real
and actual interest"'14 5 in the enforcement of restrictions as
real rights.
Building restrictions are ordinarily enforced by actions for
injunction brought by the original subdivider or by landowners
in a subdivision. 14 Violators may thus be forced to cease activ-
ities in contravention of the restrictions14 7 or to remove objec-
tionable structures. 148 Apart from the injunctive process, how-
ever, violators of building restrictions may be sued for dam-
ages;140 and, in case the building restrictions form part of a
contract that has been violated, proper parties may have recourse
to contractual remedies under the law of conventional obliga-
tions.1 ° Moreover, if the violation of a restriction fulfills the
restrictions were omitted from their original titles. This point is of no im-
portance whatsoever as it is clear that the dismissal of the suit as to these
plaintiff's would not affect the right of the other five plaintiffs to obtain the
redress granted by the trial Judge."
145. LA. CODS CIv. P. art. 681; cf. Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 661, 30
So.2d 679 (1947), Involving reservation of certain lots in the subdivision "for
business purposes for the convenience of the owners."
146. See, e.g., Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893. 207
So.2d 360 (1968); Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1960); McGuffy
v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659,
30 So.2d 678 (1947); Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942);
Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938);
Hill v. Wm. P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
147. See, e.g., Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d
360 (1968); Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1960); McGuffy
v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co.
v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938).
148. See, e.g., Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947);
Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963); Willis v. New Orleans East Unit of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., 156 So.2d
310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
149. Dicta In Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67
So. 641, 646 (1915), indicates that, upon violation of restrictions, "the occu-
pants of the lots in the subdivision" are entitled to claim "damages." Cf. LA.
R.S. 9:5622 (1950). It would seem that the action for damages contemplated
by the Queensborough decision and by the statute should be grounded on
contractual faults. No litigation concerning actions for damages for viola-
tions of restrictions seems to have reached the appellate level. See Comment,
21 LA. L. REv. 468 (1961).
150. For example; an obligor under a contract imposing building re-
strictions may be sued by the obligee for specific performance or for dissolu-
tion of the contract. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1926-1929. These contractual reme-
dies are not available to landowners in a subdivision seeking to enforce
restrictions as real rights, i.e., against violators with whom the landowners
are not in a contractual relationship. Cf. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux,
136 La. 724, 737, 67 So. 641, 646 (1915): "If these occupants of the other lots
in the subdivision were the parties plaintiff in the suit, and were the sole
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elements of delictual responsibility for damage to property, 51
if it constitutes an unreasonable use of property, 152 or if it
amounts to a disturbance of possession,'5" landowners may
demand protection of their property rights under the general
law.'5 4
Termination of building restrictions. Building restrictions
may terminate according to terms prescribed in the act that
created them,155 under rules enacted by special legislation,'5 6
or under rules adopted by jurisprudence. 157 In addition, since
building restrictions are likened to predial servitudes, the
methods provided in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 for the
extinction of predial servitudes'5 s may be applied by analogy,
to the extent that application of these methods is compatible
with the notion and function of building restrictions.159
Persons imposing building restrictions may, in the exercise
of their freedom of will, prescribe rules for termination, pro-
plaintiffs, it would seem as if they might not have the right to rescind the
sale to Cazeaux, that right not having been expressly reserved to them, or
stipulated in their favor, in the sale to Cazeaux, and it not arising in their
favor by implication, they not having been parties to the contract." It ought
to be noted, however, that landowners seeking to enforce restrictions as real
rights may be entitled to claim affirmative relief by the injunctive process;
this type of relief resembles specific performance. See Community Builders,
Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So.2d 141, 147 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963): "It is further
ordered . . . that the said defendant . . . comply with said building restric-
tion within a period of ninety days after this judgment becomes final, by...
constructing paved parking facilities as necessary."
151. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315; cf. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
§ 141 (1966).
152. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 667; cf. Roche v. St. Romain, 51 So.2d 666 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
153. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3454(2), 3455; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3656; A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 138 (1966).
154. For the availability of additional remedies for the protection of Im-
movable real rights, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 141 (1966). For
the availability of actions for declaratory judgments as to the existence or
validity of building restrictions, see McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d
154 (1960); Johnston v. Frantom, 159 So.2d 404 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); In re
Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130 So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961); LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871-1873.
155. See notes 167-168 infra; cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 709(2).
156. See LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended. See also text at notes 165-
168 infra.
157. See text at notes 173-178 infra.
158. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 783-822 (1870); Gerde v. Simonson Investments,
Inc., 251 La. 893, 900, 207 So.2d 360, 363 (1968): "The release of such a servi-
tude is a real alienation. L.S.A.-C.C. art. 817. Normally, therefore, all owners
of lots to which the servitude is due must give consent to achieve a full dis-
charge of the servitude. L.S.A.-C.C. Arts. 816-818."
159. For example, the ten-year prescription of non-use "from the day
any act contrary to the servitude has been committed" (La. Civ. Code art.
790), has been superseded by special legislation establishing a two-year pre-
scriptive period. See text at note 165 infra.
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vided, of course, that these rules imply nothing contrary to the
public order. t60 Thus, provision may be made for termination
of the restrictions upon the lapse of a period of time or upon
the happening of an event; moreover, provision may be made
for termination of the restrictions by agreement among the
landowners in whose favor the restrictions are imposed and for
the procedures by which this consent is to be obtained. 161 In the
absence of pertinent provisions in the act that imposed the
restrictions, special legislation confers on landowners represent-
ing a majority of the square footage of land in a subdivision
the right to terminate by agreement restrictions that have been
in effect for at least fifteen years.162 This agreement must be
recorded in the conveyance and mortgage records of the parish
in which the land is located.108 The language of the statute
permits the interpretation that building restrictions may be
terminated by the statutory majority either for the whole or
only a portion of the restricted area. 64
According to special legislation, actions to enjoin or to
obtain damages for any violation of building restrictions are
subject to a two-year liberative prescription that begins to run
upon the commission of a violation. 6 5 Courts interpreting the
statute, however, have rightly declared that the prescriptive
160. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 709.
161. See Gerde v. Simonson Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 900, 207 So.2d
360, 363 (1968): "The Act in the present case provided such a method [of
termination]. It required the affirmative vote in writing of the owners of a
majority of the lots, after notice to all lot owners and a meeting. Such a
provision is valid. L.S.A.-C.C. Arts. 709-821."
162. See LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended. This statutory provision has
been declared to be constitutional. Johnston v. Franton, 159 So.2d 404 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964).
163. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended. No reason has been ascertained
as to why the legislature thought it necessary to require recordation of the
agreement In the mortgage records. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 468 (1961).
164. See Comment, 21 LA. L. Rzv. 468 (1961). For the question whether
a restricted area is a subdivision or a part of a subdivision, see Lillard v. Jet
Homes, Inc., 129 So.2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); cf. Johnston v. Franton,
159 So.2d 404 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
165. See LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended. This prescription does not
merely bar actions for the enforcement of building restrictions as sut generis
real rights; it extinguishes the real right itself in the same way that the
prescription of non-use extinguishes the right of a servitude. See note 169
infra. Accordingly, any action based on principles of property law would be-
come without object after the completion of the two-year prescriptive period.
But actions for the enforcement of building restrictions that constitute per-
sonal obligations rather than real rights are subject to the ten-year liberative
prescription applicable to personal actions. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 3544; LeBlanc
v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949). There should be no
doubt that the two-year prescriptive period is inapplicable to violations of
zoning ordinances. See Lake Charles v. Fungay, 93 So.2d 252 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957).
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period begins to run upon the commencement6 6 of a noticeable
violation. 167 Thus, an activity carried on a modest scale may
not be noticeable or not a violation at all; but the same type of
activity, if expanded, could become a noticeable violation. 6 8
Upon completion of the prescription, the land is "forever free
from the restriction which has been violated."' 69 Determination
of the restriction that has been violated is a matter of statutory
as well as contractual interpretation. In case restrictions exclude
the use of the property for commercial purposes, question may
arise whether activities in violation of the restrictions free
the property from any limitations relating to commercial use
or only from limitations relating to the particular use that has
been practiced. It has been suggested that the language of the
statute "can hardly be taken to mean freedom from the whole
commercial restriction, but only freedom to the extent that
there had been a two-year unopposed violation.' '170 Louisiana
courts have held that when an owner uses his property for
commercial purposes contrary to restrictions during a period in
excess of two years, the property is free from any limitation
pertaining to commercial activities; the landowner is thus
entitled to enlarge his business, and even to conduct a business
of a different nature. 17' According to well-settled interpretation
166. See Metry Club Gardens Ass'n v. Newman, 166 So.2d 579 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964); Chexnayder v. Rogers, 95 So.2d 381 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957);
Harris v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 330 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Foti, 54
So.2d 534 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). The prescription begins to run from the
commencement of the violations rather than from the day the plaintiff
acquired knowledge of the violations. Fatjo v. Mayer, 247 La. 327, 170 So.2d
859 (1965).
167. See Roche v. St. Romain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). It
suffices for the commencement of the prescription that the violation of re-
strictions is neither secretive nor clandestine. See Fatjo v. Mayer, 247 La.
327, 170 So.2d 859 (1965).
168. See Wolley v. Cinquigranna, 188 So.2d 701 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966)
(activities of a door to door salesman did not violate building restrictions
limiting the property to residential use; but the aftivities of the same de-
fendant as field manager for door to door salesmen violated the restrictions).
169. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended. The restriction is treated as if it
never existed on that particular piece of land. See Edwards v. Wiseman, 198
La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); of. Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678
(1947).
170. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Building Restrictions, 8 LA. L. REV. 189, 238 (1948); of. Salerno v. DeLucca,
211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947).
171. See Chexnayder v. Rogers, 95 So.2d 381 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957). In
reaching this conclusion, the court aptly distinguished the case of Salerno
v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947), and declared that "the ratio
decidendi thereof is not applicable to this matter" (95 So.2d at 383 n. 4).
See also Cush v. South Acres Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 194 So.2d 788
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1967). In this case the court concluded that the entire
restriction relating to commercial uses was violated "since the property was
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of the statute, however, prescription of one type of restriction
on a particular lot does not free that lot from other restrictions"72
nor other lots from restrictions of the type that has been
violated, 173 unless, of course, there has been a general abandon-
ment of the restrictive plan or of particular restrictions.
Indeed, according to Louisiana jurisprudence constante,
building restrictions terminate by abandonment of the entire
restrictive plan 74 or by a general abandonment of a particular
restriction. 175 Abandonment of the entire restrictive plan is
ordinarily predicated on a great number of violations of all
or most restrictions.176 Upon abandonment of the entire plan all
restrictions fall, and the use of the property is free for all
purposes. Abandonment of a particular restriction is predicated
on a sufficient number of violations of that restriction in rela-
not used exclusively for residential purposes and therefore the particular
parcel of land is forever free from the restriction which has been violated."
Id. at 790.
.172. See Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Olivier v.
Berggren, 136 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); cf. Plauche v. Albert, 42
So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
173. See Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950).
174. See Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961). In this case,
defendant took the position that certain violations, "considered along with
other infractions and changes throughout the subdivision, constituted a
complete subversion of the original scheme of development; and that, con-
sequently, all imposed restrictions must be considered as having been aban-
doned and relinquished." (Id. at 799, 125 So.2d at 367). The court held, how-
ever, that the alleged infractions were "relatively minor in nature and cer-
tainly cannot be said to be so substantial, even when considered with the
other violations shown, as to constitute a waiver of the subdivision's entire
general plan or scheme." (Id. at 808, 125 So.2d at 370.) For additional de-
cisions raising the issue of abandonment of the entire plan for a subdivi-
sion, see Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942); Hill v. Win.
P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928). For cases involving failure of the
general plan devised by the subdivider, see notes 119, 120 supra.
175. See, e.g., Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Willis
v. New Orleans East Unit of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., 156 So.2d 310 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963); Finn v. Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954);
Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). Aban-
donment does not merely bar the right of action for the enforcement of
restrictions; it extinguishes the real right itself. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198
La. 382, 392, 3 So.2d 661, 666 (1941): "The question before the Court is not
one of prescription as a bar to a right of action where it otherwise presently
exists under the laws of this state, but an issue of whether or not the right
to enforce the restrictions has been lost through waiver and relinquishment
by acquiescence on the part of the landowners. As the restrictive clauses
were waived and relinquished by plaintiffs' acquiescence, they are no longer
legally in existence and, hence, there is no right of action to prescribe."
Building restrictions that establish merely personal obligations do not
terminate by abandonment. See LeBlanc v, Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1949).
176. See Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961).
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tion to the number of lots affected by it.177 Thus, if a restriction
requires that a building should face a certain street, or should
be erected a number of feet from the property line, only viola-
tions on property subject to the same restrictions are considered
in determining the question of abandonment. 17 8 When the viola-
tions are sufficient in number to warrant the conclusion that
a particular restriction has been abandoned, the property is
freed from that restriction only.1 9 Thus, a change in the neigh-
borhood from residential to commercial does not affect restric-
tions relating to the setback from property lines. s0 Changes in
the vicinity of the restricted area, but not within it, are without
effect on the validity of building restrictions in the subdivision.' 8'
Zoning ordinances neither terminate nor supersede existing
building restrictions. 8 2 For example, the zoning of a restricted
residential area as commercial does not prevent the enforcement
of existing restrictions; it may merely give rise to an inference
that the general plan has been abandoned in the area.8 3 Zoning
ordinances affecting previously unrestricted areas involve, a
valid exercise of police power and exclude the freedom of land-
owners to establish building restrictions that are incompatible
with the public acts. 8 4
Matters of interpretation. According to well-settled Lou-
isiana jurisprudence, documents establishing building restric-
tions are subject to strict interpretation. Any doubt as to the
existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions must be
resolved, therefore, in favor of the unrestricted use of the
177. See Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Finn v.
Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Foti, 54 So.2d 534
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). Conversely, a limited number of violations in a
remote part of the subdivision does not constitute abandonment of the re-
striction. See Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961); Plauche v.
Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
178. See Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Finn v.
Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954).
179. See Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961); Edwards v.
Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Rhodes v. Foti, 54 So.2d 534 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
180. See Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198. 7 So.2d 708 (1942).
181. See id.; Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949).
182. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1945(2): "[N]o general or special legislative act
can be construed as to avoid or modify a legal contract previously made."
See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 8; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 15; Alfortish v. Wagner, 200
La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942); Olivier v. Berggren, 136 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962).
183. Cf. Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
184. See Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, 216 La. 994, 45
So.2d 601 (1950).
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property.18 5 Thus, when there was doubt as to the intent of a
person to impose restrictions,' 8 or as to the existence of a
general plan,8 7 the doubt was resolved in favor of the owner
whose property was allegedly restricted.
Apart from the rule of strict interpretation, documents estab-
lishing building restrictions are subject to the general rules
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 governing the interpretation
of juridical acts. 18  Words used are to be understood in the com-
mon and usual signification;1s9 terms of art or technical phrases
are to be interpreted according to their received meaning. 9 0
Accordingly, if the document provides that the property shall
be used for residential purposes only, churches may not be
erected; 191 if commercial establishments are excluded, the erec-
tion of an advertising billboard sign violates the restriction; 192 and
if the document requires that only single residences be erected,
multiple dwellings or apartment houses are forbidden. 193
185. See Fatjo v. Mayer, 247 La. 327, 170 So.2d 859 (1965); Leonard v.
Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964); McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125
So.2d 154 (1960); Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947); Herz-
berg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). Since building restric-
tions are rights akin to predial servitudes, the rule of strict interpretation
accords with article 753 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 which declares
that doubts as to the extent or manner of using servitudes must be resolved
"in favor of the owner of the property to be affected." Surprisingly, in Cun-
ningham v. Hall, 148 So.2d 808, 810 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), the court
declared that documents establishing building restrictions must be inter-
preted "against, rather in favor of, the individual owner." See also Fisher v.
Smith, 190 So.2d 105 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
186. See Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958);
Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); cf. Begnaud v.
Hill, 109 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) (no clear intention); Abate v.
Hebert, 100 So.2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (impossible restrictions). Within
certain limits, restraints on the use of immovables may be given the form
of predial servitudes, personal obligations, or strictly speaking, building re-
strictions, i.e., sui generis real rights. Which type of right the parties in-
tended to create may be a matter of interpretation. See, e.g., McGuffy v.
Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960) (predial servitude); Cambais v. Douglas,
167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929) (personal obligations); Gerde v. Simonson
Investments, Inc., 251 La. 893, 207 So.2d 360 (1968) (building restriction).
187. See notes 119, 120 supra.
188. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1712-1723, 1945-1962; cf. Salerno v. DeLucca,
211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947).
189. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1946.
190. Id. art. 1947.
191. Willis v. New Orleans East Unit of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., 156
So.2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); cf. Cush v. South Acres Missionary Baptist
Church Inc., 194 So.2d 788 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); In re Congregation of St.
Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130 So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
192. Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947); cf. Rhodes v.
Foti, 54 So.2d 534 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Harris v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 330
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1950).
193. See Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So.
841 (1938); Olivier v. Berggren, 136 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
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The Louisiana law of building restrictions, therefore, allows
private parties considerable freedom within the bounds of public
policy, to create real rights limiting the use of real property.
As this body of law expands it is hoped that the courts will
keep in mind that it is founded upon the theory of sui generis
real rights and conventional servitudes and that unnecessary
reliance on common law terminology will result in nothing but
confusion.
Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949); cf. Cunningham v.
Hall, 148 So.2d 808, 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); "The words 'one dwelling
home' or 'single dwelling house', as used in deed restricting construction, in-
dicate a manifest intent that a residence erected should be limited in design
to the accommodation of a single family, precluding the erection of a single
building containing three wholly distinct apartments."
